Climate action, actionism, and cognitive dissonance
Delaying the decision on "do we need to do anything at all about carbon dioxide" can have knock-on effects for the decision on "what exactly do we need to do about carbon dioxide".
Global climate politics is a practical example of multiple cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance arises when a decision is taken that later turns out to be wrong (in our case, realizing that doing nothing about the climate issue was wrong) and, on the other hand, when one becomes aware that something one has started is becoming more strenuous or unpleasant than expected.
It is not uncommon to work with bogus solutions that cannot contribute decisively to solving the problem but leave the positive feeling that one is resolving the cognitive dissonance through activity and precisely these bogus solutions.
In the case of the climate issue, it is probably above all the many well-founded tightening of limits for the emission of greenhouse gases. If you don't know how to get all the CO2 out of the atmosphere to meet the limits by a certain date, it doesn't help much to make the limits even stricter. That doesn't really bring us any closer to the solution.
To use an analogy: If I decide to lose 10 pounds by Christmas, but I keep eating chocolate, and when I get into a state of cognitive dissonance and decide that I'd better lose 15 pounds, it's immediately clear that it's not going to get any better. Continuing to dig coal out of the ground and burn it while at the same time setting ever more ambitious climate targets is precisely this kin of cognitive dissonance. And climate protection projects that look great on paper (and in newsclips) but are far too inefficient or energy-consuming in practice, such as some synthetic fuels, do not bring us any closer to a real solution.
At the same time, there are technologies that have the potential to really get things moving, besides the consistent renunciation of non-renewable energy sources (coal, oil, gas). CCS could be one such solution, but it comes with a long list of drawbacks.
Carbon capture installations lead to massive loss of efficiency in power plants.
Suitable storage sites are not available everywhere fossil fuels are burnt; the CO2 has to be transported over long distances, including in yet-to-be-built pipelines.
No one wants large quantities of liquefied or compressed CO2 in their neighborhood (on shore).
CO2 cannot be introduced into the oceans because the water becomes acidic (calcifying organisms such as mussels and corals can no longer build up calcium carbonate shells and skeletons) and oxygen-deficient zones develop.
It is not possible to capture the CO2 at all if the producer is non-stationary, which includes pretty much all vehicles.
It would now be necessary to launch less energy-intensive processes to compensate for emissions. This could be, above all, the arbitrarily scalable sequestration of biochar and, above all, hydrochar from biomass.
However, it is particularly important that stringent documentation of the sequestration of carbon is carried out in order to be credible. For example, the origin of the biomass, the conversion by means of pyrolysis or HTC processes and the energy consumed and CO2 released in the process, as well as the type and quality of storage must be documented and certified.
Only then can these certificates have real meaning and credibility. But then we will have an instrument to work concretely on the climate crisis and to recapture the carbon that has been released so far. And also to refrain from too costly or dangerous processes and instead compensate safely and reliably.
In next week’s newsletter, we will discuss how to design carbon markets to ensure that the certified activities aren’t just greenwashing.
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